Posted by Bill Swislow, member of the Arrian reading group 2
Thinking about Alexander’s risk taking, it seems fair to say that by our standards his behavior is reckless on the face of it. After all, as pointed out on a recent call, our political leaders wouldn’t consider personally guiding troops into battle. Heck, our military leaders wouldn’t either. Most countries go to great lengths to protect their leaders from all personal risk. That’s partly self-serving pusillanimity on the part of the politicians, but it also reflects the historical insight that great causes have often perished on the death or capture of their leader.
On the other hand, standards and expectations were clearly different in the past, as Arrian’s attitude toward Darius’ flights from battle makes clear. The circumstances under which Darius fled seem less important to Arrian than the fact that he fled at all. It’s also not feasible to think we can know how much personal risk was really involved for any particular role in an ancient battle. What exposure did Alexander really take on when he led those charges? Got me. However, what we can be sure of — and what makes Alexander’s risk-taking seem totally rational however great the danger — is that the risk of being killed or captured was far far higher if you were on the losing/retreating side. I think that’s true for both the heat of battle and in many cases, as Darius’ own example shows, in its aftermath as well. So at any point where Alexander weighed the choice of his protecting his person vs. turning the tide of battle, it almost had to be the right decision to try to turn the tide whatever the risk.
Once you’ve decided to go to battle the die is cast and the appearance of uncertainty or weakness is the great danger, which of course is one of the things business leaders can learn from Alexander. (Of course, over-confidence is another lesson from history that could lead to some contrary conclusions.)
09. June 2011 by Arrian
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Commentary |
Tags: Alexander the Great, Arrian, Darius III, leadership, Persian Empire |
1 comment
Professor John Marincola, the Leon Golden Professor of Classics at Florida State University, delivered on June 8, 2011 Marathon2500 Lecture #*, “Epilogue: What happened after the Battle of Marathon”, to the Reading Odyssey’s global remote lecture network.
You can listen here to the podcast:
And see the slides from his talk here:
About Marathon2500
With the support of several of the world’s best Hellenic scholars and sports historians, Marathon2500 commemorated the 2,500-year anniversary of the Battle of Marathon with nine lectures between September 2010 and September 2011 on the cultural, intellectual and athletic legacy of the battle. Delivered before live audiences, webcast online and archived for listening on demand, Marathon2500 was a program of the Reading Odyssey chaired by Professor Paul Cartledge, A.G. Leventis Chair of Greek Culture at Cambridge University. To multiply the impact around the world, the Reading Odyssey worked with libraries, community centers, universities, colleges, high schools, museums and sports organizations to create satellite listening centers (see more about the remote lecture network here).
Marathon2500 Podcast Library
Professor Paul Cartledge and the Reading Odyssey have preserved the Marathon2500 lecture series in podcast format for readers, students and scholars.
To access the whole library, click here: http://www.marathon2500.org/podcasts
– – –
John Marincola Biography
Office: 119 Dodd Hall
Phone: (850) 644-4259
Fax: (850) 644-4073
Email: jmarinco<at>fsu<dot>edu
John Marincola (Ph.D., Brown) is the Leon Golden Professor of Classics. He specializes in Greek and Roman historiography and rhetoric. He is the author of Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge, 1997), Greek Historians (Oxford, 2001), and (with Michael A. Flower) Herodotus: Histories Book IX (Cambridge, 2002). He has edited A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography (Blackwell, 2007) and co-edited (with Carolyn Dewald) the Cambridge Companion to Herodotus (Cambridge, 2006); he has revised the Penguin edition of Herodotus’ Histories (1996; further revised edition, 2003), and will soon publish a revision of Plutarch’s Rise and Fall of Athens (Penguin, 2010). He has written articles on many Greek and Roman historians and is currently at work on a book on Hellenistic historiography. Professor Marincola is also a member of the board of the Reading Odyssey and was the first scholar to work in partnership with the organization.
Research Projects in Progress
• Hellenistic Historiography
• Studies in Plutarch’s de Malignitate Herodoti
• Plutarch’s Persian Wars: Myth History and Identity in Roman Greece
Recent Publications and Lectures
Books
• Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography (Cambridge 1997)
• Greek Historians (Greece & Rome New Surveys in the Classics, no. 31); Oxford 2001
• Herodotus: Histories Book IX, edited with introduction and notes by M. A. Flower and John Marincola (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics, Cambridge 2002)
• A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography, 2 vols. (Oxford and Malden, Mass. 2007).
Articles
• ‘Historiography’, in A. Erskine, ed., A Companion to Ancient History (Blackwell 2009) 13–22.
• ‘Odysseus and the Historians’, SyllClass 18 (2007) 1–79.
• ‘Universal History from Ephorus to Diodorus’, in A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography (Oxford 2007) 171–9.
Lectures
• ‘The “Rhetoric” of History: Exemplarity, Allusion and Intertextuality in Ancient Historiographical Speeches’, keynote address at the Conference Perspektive, Polyphonie, Performativität: Funktionen von Reden in antiken Geschichtswerken, Giessen, September 25, 2008.
• ‘Eros and Empire: Virgil, Sallust, and the Narrative of Civil War’, Cambridge Literature Seminar, Cambridge, May 28, 2008.
• ‘History and Tragedy – and Comedy?’, University of Bristol, May 22, 2008.
09. June 2011 by Phil Terry
Categories: Marathon2500 |
Tags: Battle of Marathon, Herodotus, John Marincola, Marathon2500, Paul Cartledge |
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Here’s the audio recording for the Arrian Book 2 conference call (Andre’s group). Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
07. June 2011 by astipanovic
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Reader Call |
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Bogdan Burliga of Gdansk University published a glowing review of the Landmark Arrian, the new edition we are currently using in our two Reading Odyssey reading group sections.
Most of the adult readers reading Arrian’s Campaigns of Alexander for the first time are enjoying the experience of reading this very helpful version – the translations, the margin summaries, the introduction, the very short appendices, the index, the wonderful maps, the footnotes – all combine to make this this classic work of history accessible.
We agree with Bogdan Burliga when he says in the conclusion of his review:
With this path-breaking edition the reader has been equipped with an exceptional inquiry tool. In the Alexander and Arrian studies – a true ktema es aiei [i.e. ‘clear hit’]
– Phil
Bryn Mawr Classical Review
2011.05.58
http://www.bmcreview.org/2011/05/20110558.html
31. May 2011 by Phil Terry
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Commentary |
Tags: Arrian, Bogdan Burliga, Bryn Mawr, Bryn Mawr Classical Review, Gdansk University |
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Robert Strassler, independent scholar, gave a wonderful discussion with moderator Professor Paul Cartledge, chairman of Marathon2500, on the topic of “Herodotus and the Invention of History.”
You can listen to on the web or download the podcast here:
Marathon2500 is the Reading Odyssey’s yearlong commemoration of the 2,500-year anniversary of The Battle of Marathon. Chaired by Professor Paul Cartledge, A.G. Leventis Chair of Greek Culture at Cambridge University, Marathon2500 is the leading global event focused on this important milestone. The program includes 8 global lectures from leading scholars, free phone/web-based Herodotus reading groups and participant groups from around the world.
30. May 2011 by Phil Terry
Categories: Herodotus, Lecture, Marathon2500 |
Tags: Herodotus, Marathon2500, Paul Cartledge, Robert Strassler |
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Wanted to share with the Arrian reading group this Mannerist painting by Veronese in the National Gallery in the UK. It shows the wife and daughters of Darius genuflecting before Alexander and his general Hephaestion after Alexander’s victory at the Battle of Issus in southern Anatolia. It is one of the more intimate scenes in Book 2, taking us into the tent of the defeated Persian king, who has fled the scene leaving his family behind. Veronese has taken his Mannerist liberties with the costumes and setting, of course, but he has stuck to the original plot. Note how Hephaestion (whose legs are oddly red) is gesturing to Alexander (whose legs are oddly yellow), indicating the moment when Darius’ wife makes the mistake of thinking Hephaestion is Alexander. When he corrects her, she and her daughters fall to the ground to express their shame.
Also note the monkey.
Link to the National Gallery web site where you can zoom in to see more detail.
http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/paintings/paolo-veronese-the-family-of-darius-before-alexander
26. May 2011 by Arrian
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Commentary |
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After Book I concludes with Alexander’s occupation of various cities in Asia Minor, Book II opens with a return to the question of Persian naval superiority in the Mediterranean. Earlier in Book I, Alexander had deliberately disbanded much of his naval force after the siege of Miletus. Arrian reminds us: “…by capturing the coastal cities he would dissolve the Persian fleet, since it would find no crews to man its ships, nor would it have any place to land along the coast of Asia” (Book 1.20.1, p. 40 Landmark Arrian edition).
1. How does this strategy play out in the opening sections of Book II (i.e. 2.1 – 2.2.5)? How are the Persians able to take advantage of this situation? How does Alexander’s strategy offset Persian naval superiority? How important is holding naval superiority in Book II?
2. The famous story of the Gordion knot is addressed in sections 2.3.1-2.3.8 (pp. 60-61). How important is this digression for Arrian’s portrayal of Alexander? Is there any real historical significance to this story with respect to Alexander’s fortunes at this point in the campaign against Persia? How much importance has Arrian placed in legend up to this point in his history? Does the story in 2.4.7-11 about Alexander’s illness add anything significant to our understanding of Alexander as a leader or to the outcome of his campaign against Persia?
3. In the initial moves of both Macedonians and Persians up to Issus in sections 2.6-2.7 (pp. 65-70), how are Darius’ and Alexander’s personalities compared and contrasted? How much of Darius’ decision making are we allowed to “see” as opposed to Alexander’s? How has Arrian judged these command decisions at this point? What characteristics of command are emphasized here from either leader?
4. As each side maneuvers into position at Issus, how is each side portrayed in terms of strength and formidability? What is the decisive moment in the battle for Arrian? for you? How is Darius’ “advantage” at the beginning of the battle lost? Was it Alexander’s genius or luck or both? What part do Greek mercenaries play on the Persian side? What characteristic moves does Alexander make in this battle with respect to previous battles?
5. How much more important is the aftermath of the battle of Issus with respect to Alexander’s larger plans? In sections 2.11.8-2.15.5 (pp. 76-82), based on Darius’ peace overture, what do you suppose Darius’ intentions are? According to the terms of his peace offer, does it sound like Darius’ empire is really threatened at this point, or does it sound like Darius thinks he has plenty of options due to his vast wealth and land? What does Alexander believe is the best way to proceed against Darius? How is he counseled otherwise? What should Alexander be cautious of? How rational are both Darius and Alexander in their strategic judgments at this point?
6. As Alexander approaches Tyre in 2.15.6-2.16.7 (pp. 82-84), it seems that this important city of commerce and naval power is about to surrender to him, but something goes awry concerning the festival of Herakles (i.e. Hercules). What impedes Alexander from being welcomed by the Tyrians? What does it have to do with Herakles, if at all? Why is the occupation of Tyre so important to Alexander? [see 2.17.1-2.18.1 or p. 85]. Why would the occupation of Tyre be such a “Herculean” task?
7. As the siege of Tyre gets underway in 2.18.2-2.24.6 (pp. 85-94), how does Alexander’s judgment about attacking this island fortress initially bear fruit? In what way does the “tide turn” against the Tyrians? How great of a commander does Alexander prove to be at sea rather than on land? How capable are the Tyrians at sea warfare? How does Alexander make the best of the Tyrian naval attack? In which of the battles in Book II does Alexander show more creativity and daring, at Issus or at the siege of Tyre?
8. In the concluding sections 2.25.1-2.27.6 (pp. 94-97), how does Darius’ peace overture here compare to his earlier offer in 2.14? What has changed in Darius’ offer and what has remained the same? How does the Macedonian assault on Gaza compare with the siege of Tyre? Comparing Alexander’s dream during the siege of Tyre (2.18.1, p. 85) with the omen at Gaza (2.26.4, p. 95), how do these portents fit with the flow of Arrian’s history? What point is Arrian trying to make by including these ancedotes in a serious account of Alexander’s campaigns? (What possible stories or anecdotes might Arrian be choosing to keep out of his history?)
18. May 2011 by astipanovic
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Study Questions |
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Here’s the audio recording for the Arrian Book I conference call (Andre’s group). Listen online or download the mp3 file and listen to it as a podcast on your ipod.
12. May 2011 by astipanovic
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Reader Call |
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“The beauty of Alexander’s life is that he did live out so many of the myths. He is the greatest Greek hero of all. In his story we find Achilles (who he outdid), Oedipus (hurt by his mother, Olympias, and her possible involvement in Philip’s death), Hercules (hurt by Roxane and his son’s fate, a son he has to abandon in the end because of bad faith with her over Hephaestion), Jason (hurt by his mother and wife’s crimes — Medea), and Prometheus (who sacrificed himself to elevate mankind to another level).” – Oliver Stone, director of Alexander: Revisited.
From an Alexander dialogue (with video) in three parts at Forbes, with Stone and leading scholars Paul Cartledge of Cambridge/NYU (also a Reading Odyssey boardmember) and James Romm of Bard.
01. May 2011 by Arrian
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Commentary |
Tags: Alexander the Great, Landmark Arrian |
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1. In the Editor’s Preface (p. xxxiv), James Romm quotes P. A. Brunt’s assessment of Arrian: “He was a simple, honest soul, but no historian.” After reading Arrian’s preface on p. 3, what is your first impression? What do we consider to be an historian today? How does Arrian account for sources for this history? How does Arrian’s preface strike you in terms of the validity of his efforts?
2. [Sections 1.1-1.6, pp. 4-13] As Alexander begins his campaign into the Balkans, north of Macedonia, what does each account against hostile forces (i.e. Thracians, Triballoi, Getae, Illyrians, Taulantians) reveal about Alexander? his army? What tactics are included by Arrian in these accounts? What do we learn about Alexander’s leadership in each of these encounters?
3. [Sections 1.7-1.10, pp. 13-21] While Alexander is occupied with events north of Macedonia, intrigues south of Macedonia at Thebes soon force him to deal with uprisings among the Greeks. Why were events at Thebes so significant with respect to the rest of Greece? What are the pros and cons to Alexander’s handling of the revolt at Thebes? How impartial do you think Arrian is in handling the events at Thebes?
4. [Sections 1.11-1.12, pp. 22-26] How significant are Alexander’s first actions as he steps onto Asia from Europe? How significant is the site of these actions? What does Arrian’s second preface [I.12.2-5] reveal, being placed right after Alexander’s entrance onto Asia?
5. [Sections 1.13-1.16, pp. 27-33] How do the Persians react to Alexander at this first encounter? Do the Persians underestimate or overestimate the Macedonians? Which plan do you think would have worked better, Parmenion’s or Alexander’s? Why? What are Alexander’s most valuable traits as his army makes contact with the Persians at the Granicus river? What are his mistakes?
6. [Sections 1.17-1.19, pp. 34-40] As Alexander moves further into Persian territory, capturing Sardis, Ephesus, Miletus, he has to deal with ways of keeping this area secure. What solutions are Alexander reported to have devised? How effective are these measures?
7. [Sections 1.20-1.23, pp. 40-45] Arrian spends a noteworthy amount of time narrating the siege of Halicarnassus, a Greek port-city on the western shore of Asia Minor. How can we explain Alexander’s difficulties at this point of his campaign? What are the problems Alexander faces at sea? on land? How does Alexander’s relationship with the Carian Queen Ada figure into his dilemma at Halicarnassus?
8. [Sections 1.24-29, pp. 45-53] As Alexander’s army mops up Ionia and prepares to push further east along the southern coast of Asia Minor, he encounters cities of non-Greek origin who alternately make treaties or resist his advance. Does Alexander rely more on diplomacy or military force in dealing with these various tribes and city-states? What is Alexander’s main concern at this point in his Asian campaign? Is Alexander portrayed as surprised in any way with his army’s progress so far?
27. April 2011 by astipanovic
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Study Questions |
Tags: Alexander the Great, Landmark Arrian |
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Was Alexander reckless?
Posted by Bill Swislow, member of the Arrian reading group 2
Thinking about Alexander’s risk taking, it seems fair to say that by our standards his behavior is reckless on the face of it. After all, as pointed out on a recent call, our political leaders wouldn’t consider personally guiding troops into battle. Heck, our military leaders wouldn’t either. Most countries go to great lengths to protect their leaders from all personal risk. That’s partly self-serving pusillanimity on the part of the politicians, but it also reflects the historical insight that great causes have often perished on the death or capture of their leader.
On the other hand, standards and expectations were clearly different in the past, as Arrian’s attitude toward Darius’ flights from battle makes clear. The circumstances under which Darius fled seem less important to Arrian than the fact that he fled at all. It’s also not feasible to think we can know how much personal risk was really involved for any particular role in an ancient battle. What exposure did Alexander really take on when he led those charges? Got me. However, what we can be sure of — and what makes Alexander’s risk-taking seem totally rational however great the danger — is that the risk of being killed or captured was far far higher if you were on the losing/retreating side. I think that’s true for both the heat of battle and in many cases, as Darius’ own example shows, in its aftermath as well. So at any point where Alexander weighed the choice of his protecting his person vs. turning the tide of battle, it almost had to be the right decision to try to turn the tide whatever the risk.
Once you’ve decided to go to battle the die is cast and the appearance of uncertainty or weakness is the great danger, which of course is one of the things business leaders can learn from Alexander. (Of course, over-confidence is another lesson from history that could lead to some contrary conclusions.)
09. June 2011 by Arrian
Categories: Arrian-Alexander, Commentary | Tags: Alexander the Great, Arrian, Darius III, leadership, Persian Empire | 1 comment