[Xenophon] Xenophon Study Guide Questions for Book 4

[Andre Stipanovic]

Hi all,
I hope your reading is coming along well.  I found Book IV to be complex,
so I decided to try to contextualize each question to help us weigh the
events in Book IV better.  These questions help to point the reader to the
central focus in each section of Xenophon's narrative as well as giving us
room to see wider applications for the Hellenika to our own times.  I hope
they help.
Look for questions to Book V to come soon.  Next week I will send out some
requests to some of you to kick off a question during our next discussion.
 We'll convene in two weeks.
Best, 
Andre
>Xenophon Reading Group 2010
>Book IV Study Guide Questions

>1.  [4.1] Agesilaos the matchmaker
>In 395 B.C., Book IV opens with Agesilaos commanding a foreign
>expeditionary force in Asia Minor against Persian interests and in
>Persian territory.  Why does Agesilaos feel compelled to arrange a
>marriage between Otys, king of Paphlagonia, and the daughter of
>Spithridates?  What are his strategic reasons?  His personal reasons?
> How does the Spartan Herippidas both help and hinder Agesilaos’
>intentions with this marriage arrangement?

>2.  [4.2-4.5] Spartans in battle (394-390 B.C.)
>Book 4 concerns itself mostly with the land battles raging in Greece
>between Sparta and an anti-Sparta coalition of Greek city-states.  What
>quotes did you notice as you read about other battles, that showed
>Xenophon’s bias either one way or another?  Does he ever show the
>Spartans in a less-than-favorable light?  If so, how does Xenophon
>justify a Spartan defeat or setback?  Who is Xenophons’ favorite
>person to write about?

>3.  [4.6] Agesilaos invades and checks Acarnanian influence? (389 BC)
>In order to honor its alliance with Achaea, Sparta sends troops across
>the Corinthian gulf in order to repel an Acarnanian incursion on Calydos,
>an Achaean colony.  Although the Spartan general Agesilaos sets up a
>trophy after a hard-fought land battle, he nevertheless withdraws his
>troops in autumn with little else to claim against the Acarnanians and
>their imminent threat on the Achaeans.  Should the Spartans have done
>more for the Achaeans?  Was Agesilaos as fault in any way?  Does what
>happens in Acarnania really matter to Spartan interests on the macro
>level?  How about earlier in this Book with Sparta’s operations around
>Corinth?  Do you see the Spartans as not strong enough to capture the
>city of Corinth in Book 4.4-5?  What might Xenophon be saying (albeit
>subtly or even subconsciously) about Spartan  power?  What could the
>explanation be for Sparta’s inability to completely subdue Greece?  Is
>mismanagement the issue?  Bad luck?  Impiety?  Lack of favor from the
>gods?  Superior strategy from the other side?

>4.  [4.7] Piety and Warfare:  the Spartan campaign against Argos (388)
>Agesipolis leads an invasion of Argos after carefully consulting Zeus and
>Apollo whether “it would be considered in accord with piety to reject a
>proclamation of a holy truce when it had been unjustly declared”
>(4.7.2).  Having received positive responses, Agesipolis marshals his
>troops at Phleious (near the isthmus) and marches southward towards
>Argos.  Xenophon makes an interesting comment on piety and warfare in
>this section.  What oracles were consulted?  The campaign begins and
>ends ritually with specific sacrifices.  Why?  What portents or omens
>are described in 4.7?  To which deities would each portent/omen be
>ascribed to in Greek culture?  How do we know?  Using Agesipolis as his
>main example of generalship and ritual piety, Xenophon avoids using
>Agesilaos, why?  Why haven’t we heard more about sacrifices before
>battle in other parts of the Hellenika?  [See Appendix J for more
>information about Ancient Greek Religion.]

>5.  [4.8] War at sea: Persia and the Greek city-states (394-389 B.C)
>Persian interests are fueled by Sparta’s naval setback at Cnidus.
> With a commingling of so many different interests all fueled by Persian
>money, Xenophon thus shares this political paradox with us:  “…both
>sides were acting in a way most opposed to their best interests, for the
>Athenians, who considered the King a friend, were making an alliance with
>Euagoras, who was fighting against the King, and Teleutias, even though
>the Spartans were at war with the King, was destroying those who were
>also sailing the wage war against him” (4.8.24).  How are Persian
>interests understood in this political context?  How does Xenophon
>comment on the way that Persia plays one Greek city-state off another?
> How effective is Persia’s policy vis-à-vis Greece at this point?
> Do you think the Persian King is aware of such undercurrents or cross
>purposes among his subordinates?  If so, does he or should he care?
> What sort of irony is there from the Greek point of view?







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